Forestry and Plantation Development

While Cambodia’s forest resource base is estimated to cover over half of Cambodia’s land area, much of it has been significantly degraded over the last ten to fifteen years. Substantial areas were allocated as timber concessions, other areas were logged by non-concessionaires. Increasingly, forest cover is being lost permanently as it is clear cut for large-scale plantation developments controlled by a few wealthy businessmen. Meanwhile, a growing population and increasing consumption of timber, fuel wood, and a range of non-timber forest products is placing the remaining resources under significant pressure.

An additional threat is the road building programs of timber concessionaires and other companies, together with those financed through bilateral and multilateral aid, which have made forest areas in many parts of Cambodia easily accessible. This is facilitating significant migration of settlers into forest areas, many of whom subsequently seek to clear forestland and gain title to newly cleared areas. These developments have a number of implications for Cambodia’s forests, their future commercial potential, and for those indigenous groups that have traditionally resided in and around forest areas.

While the forest resource base is under pressure, significant potential exists for the prevention of poverty through the development of community forestry and joint forest management systems that build upon the traditional integration of forests and fisheries within the agricultural systems of Khmers and minority groups. At present, many local communities are making determined efforts to prevent illegal logging in their areas; however they are allowed little scope to play an active role in managing the forests.

In recognition of the failures of the timber concession system and effective forest management reform in general, Cambodia’s international donors and the Royal Government of Cambodia commissioned an Independent Forest Sector Review (IFSR), which started in September 2003 and concluded in April 2004. This exercise was originally intended to encompass six months fieldwork; in order that the review team might generate new data and produce a comprehensive assessment of the forests’ full range of values. Unfortunately the WGNRM decided to remove most of the additional data collection component of the study, thus reducing the IFSR to a desk review of Cambodia’s forest sector. The predictable outcome was that the review was short on new insights and its proposals for future management of the forests lacked detail and specificity.

Despite the IFSR’s shortcomings, its recommendations do nevertheless provide a workable basis for future progress in forest reform. Arguably the most important of these recommendations are the IFSR’s contention that the forest concession system should be closed and that production forest should instead be managed via a ‘partnership forestry system’. Partnership forestry envisages control of forest areas being devolved to commune council level, with scope for actual management of the forest being undertaken by community forestry groups or small-scale commercial operators. Much work needs to be done by the government, donors and NGOs to develop this concept. Nonetheless, partnership forestry would appear to offer far greater scope for sustainable resource management and equitable benefit sharing than the timber concession, conversion or annual coupe systems that currently prevail in Cambodia.

Maintenance of the moratorium on logging and transportation has succeeded in largely eliminating the industrial-scale illegal logging operations that characterised the activities of the timber concessionaires. For this, the government should be congratulated. Nevertheless, medium-scale illegal logging operations continue in all of Cambodia’s forests, both in production forests and protected areas, and are seriously damaging the resource. The majority of these operations are organised by members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and police, in conjunction with commercial timber traders.

As the Prime Minister himself has observed, only those who have the backing of high-ranking officials and the rich and powerful can undertake illegal logging activities in Cambodia. Those orchestrating cutting on the ground are invariably working for or paying a percentage to members of the political elite situated in Phnom Penh. Despite progress on some structural aspects of forest management, the cronyism and corruption that drive decision making have not been addressed. Evidence gathered in 2004 by NGOs and others suggests that almost all serious forest crimes are committed with the knowledge or active participation of members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, the Forest Administration, the police and other officials. Despite this, those provisions of the Forestry Law relating to crimes committed by officials have not once been implemented since the law’s introduction in 2002. This failure to enforce the law raises serious questions about the level of institutional commitment to genuine reform.

Large-scale logging is also occurring under the guise of land concessions and plantations situated on forestland. Plantation developments have frequently targeted the most valuable forest areas rather than non-forest areas or scrublands that would be more appropriate for conversion to agriculture. With the timber concession system in suspension, these conversion projects are being used as an alternative means of accessing the resource. Almost all have been awarded in secret; moreover many clearly contravene the Land Law, the Sub-Decree on Forest Concession Management and the Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management and the Sub-Decree on Environmental Impact Process. Several are controlled or executed by the same companies (for example timber concessionaire Pheapimex) and the same subcontractors (former partners of Pheapimex, Everbright and Kingwood companies for example). A recent addition to the array of companies poised to embark on major forest conversion projects is Asia Pulp and Paper, a firm notorious for its destruction of primary forests in Indonesia.

Large-scale economic land concessions are also being illegally established in Cambodia’s national protected areas, threatening forest ecosystems, watershed and biodiversity values as well as contradicting the Cambodian government’s commitments to national and international conservation efforts.

While in one sense, such conversion projects are simply timber concessions by another name, this analogy understates the extent of the damage that they inflict. Whereas timber concessions in Cambodia have been characterised by intensive over-logging, economic concessions on forestland involve clear-cutting the forest resulting in permanent destruction.

If all the slated economic concessions on forestland proceed, conversion will accelerate, a few families and companies will become the de facto owners of the bulk of Cambodia’s converted forestland, and inequality in the distribution of income will worsen.

Cambodia’s remaining forest / timber concessions have been largely inactive since the January 2002 moratorium on logging and the May 2002 moratorium on the transportation of logs. The intention of these moratoria was to compel the companies to produce sustainable forest management plans (SFMPs) and environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs) to internationals standards. However, three years after the initial deadline for submission, not one of the companies has complied with this requirement. While thirteen companies eventually submitted plans and then revised them with assistance from the World Bank’s Forest Concession Management and Control Project, their quality remains extremely poor.

These deficiencies were highlighted by a review of the concessionaires’ SFMPs and ESIAs commissioned by the Donor Working Group on Natural Resource Management. This WGNRM review recommended that none of the concessionaires be allowed to recommence activities without first carrying out substantial amendments to their existing plans. In its recommendations, the Independent Forest Sector Review went further, drawing the logical conclusion that the entire concession system be closed. The RGC has yet to respond to this and the IFSR’s other recommendations, however.

Cutting of resin trees continues despite provisions in the forest law prohibiting their cutting[1], and increased knowledge of the high levels of income villagers generate through resin tapping of resin trees.[2] Much of the current cutting is occurring under the guise of the land concession and plantation developments; for example Tumring rubber plantation in Kompong Thom. Meanwhile there are strong indications that the forest concessionaires intend to cut the resin trees of villagers in concession areas. Inventory data that concessionaires have included in their SFMPs and ESIAs does not acknowledge that much of their proposed annual allowable cut is made up of resin trees. Consultants working on the World Bank project’s Forest Concession Management and Control Project have indicated that the issue of resin trees has not been factored into their assessment of forest concessions’ commercial viability. These consultants have instead advocated that companies ignore the law and negotiate with villagers over the selling of resin trees to enable them to be cut.

Both the Cambodian government and some members of the donor community have been trumpeting the potential of rural Cambodia for agro-industry, and in particular, for the production of rubber.[3] This bullish appraisal of Cambodia’s potential for rubber production seems to have ignored the long-term downward trend in the international market price for rubber, and natural rubber’s substitutability with synthetic rubber.[4] In contrast the international price for dipterocarp oleoresin has risen considerably since the 1970s due to the large scale deforestation that has occurred over the past few decades in Insular Southeast Asia.[5] In addition, resin tapping implies the preservation of Cambodia’s dipterocarp forests and would as such have a number of significant environmental benefits.

The constant refrain of both government and donors is that the policy reforms planned and implemented are aimed at the reduction of poverty. Almost every government statement and donor plan of action is now justified with reference to its impact in reducing poverty. However government practice, often financed and legitimated by the donor community is placing Cambodia on the trajectory of increasing inequality and possibly pushing a significant portion of rural dwellers towards deeper poverty. This applies particularly to forest dependent communities who have had their access to forest resources curtailed, the products on which they most depend for their income usurped by others or taxed at almost their full market value[6], and now their forest taken away from them through the promotion of poorly conceived development schemes such as the Tumring rubber plantation. For many in rural areas, the future remains bleak.

Cambodia is at a crossroads. Cambodia faces the significant risk of becoming the Haiti of the Asia-Pacific, with continued impoverishment of the majority, the loss of almost all forest cover, and ongoing threats of social instability. Basing forest management on forest concessions, annual coupes, and large-scale land concessions will likely lead Cambodia toward this scenario.

Alternatively, Cambodian policy makers could choose to replicate the more equitable development model of countries that have managed to preserve forest resources in a manner that provides for the livelihood needs of rural communities, and ensures the maintenance of key ecological and hydrological systems. This will entail implementing an alternative forest management strategy that recognizes that Cambodia will only retain its forests if communities become central to their management, and are granted rights to protect, manage, and benefit from forest areas.

1. Terminate the forest concession system, in line with Recommendation D/21 of the 2004 Independent Forest Sector Review commissioned by the RGC and donors.

2. Maintain the existing moratoria on logging and transportation of logs, until the following steps have been completed:

3. Complete the draft Protected Areas Law. The draft law should be made publicly available prior to passage, allowing sufficient time for public comment.

4. Impose a moratorium on the construction of roads on forestland, in line with Recommendation D/32 of the 2004 Independent Forest Sector Review commissioned by the RGC and donors.

1. Establish an inter-agency authority independent from forest management functions to monitor forest crimes and undertake law enforcement operations. This agency could be supported by civil society organisations and financed by a trust fund managed by international donors.

2. Review the performance of the current independent monitor of the forest sector at the expiration of its existing contract. Revise the independent monitor’s terms of reference; to provide it with greater independence and a broader mandate to fulfil this important function.

1. Translate recent renewed pledges to combat corruption into immediate action. Officials and RCAF officers involved in corruption and misappropriation of state assets should be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the law. Senior officials and military officers should be made accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

2. Ensure full disclosure of documents of public interest concerning the forest sector, for example concession boundaries, investment agreements, details of ownership of the companies concerned, permits for cutting, transportation, collection, export of forest products etc. These documents should be published online, while printed copies should also be made available through the Forest Administration Public Affairs Unit.

3. This sector-specific measure should be underpinned by the introduction of an Anti-Corruption Law that imposes severe penalties on officials found guilty of corrupt practices, including misappropriation of state assets. This law should encompass the following elements:

4. Establish an independent body comprising Ministers, international donors and civil society representatives to monitor usage of Cambodia’s natural resources and revenues generated. This independent body should perform the following functions:

1. Withdraw all military units stationed inside or on the boundaries of protected areas.

2. Disclose the location and legal status of all the Military Development Zones. Terminate all such zones that are situated on forestland, in protected areas, or are otherwise contrary to the law.

3. Alleviate the threat to Cambodia’s forests posed by an oversized and largely redundant military. Cancel the recently announced plans to re-introduce conscription for men aged 18-30. Embark on wide-ranging reform of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. Principal outcomes of this reform process should be i) the creation of a professional military that meets Cambodia’s defence needs and ii) demobilisation of all troops surplus to these requirements.

At the Consultative Group meeting, Cambodia’s international donors should link disbursement of non-humanitarian aid to demonstrable progress in implementing reforms in accordance with set time-lines.

[1] Article 29A.3 Forest law states: “it shall be prohibited to harvest the following anywhere within the Permanent Forest Reserve.... Trees within a species that local communities have tapped to extract resin for customary use”.

[2] See Tom D. Evans, et al, A study of resin-tapping and livelihoods in Southern Mondulkiri, Cambodia, with implications for conservation and forest management, Wildlife Conservation Society, Phnom Penh, January 2003; Ian G. Baird, “Dipterocarpus Wood Resin Tenure, Management and Trade: Practices of the Brao in Northeast Cambodia”, Master of Arts Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Victoria, 2003; McAndrew, John P., Mam Sambath, Hong Kimly, and Ly Bunthai. "Indigenous Adaptation to a Decline in Natural Resources: The Experience of Two Phnong Communes in Northeast Cambodia." Phnom Penh: CIDSE, draft, 2003.

[3] For instance, the World Bank’s recent concept paper on the sources of growth noted: “Rubber is potentially Cambodia’s most valuable natural resource after timber. Rubber was once Cambodia’s prime earner of foreign exchange but now the plantations are in decline; the trees are old, equipment is obsolete and in poor condition and the quality of the rubber is very low.” See: World Bank, “Cambodia: Sources of Growth and Poverty Reduction Study”, World Bank, Phnom Penh, September 2003, pg. 5.

[4] See “Rubber barons?”, The Economist, 29 May, 2003; “Snapped”, The Economist, 16 December, 1999.

[5] See Renée Ankarfjärd & Miran Kegl, “Tapping oleoresin from Dipterocarpus alatus (Dipterocarpaceae) in a Lao Village”, Economic Botany, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1998, pp. 7-14; Rosemary Gianno, “The exploitation of resinous products in a lowland Malayan forest”, Wallaceana, Vol. 43, 1986, pp. 3-6.

[6] See Prom Tola and Bruce McKenney, “Forest product trade in Cambodia: a case study in resin”, Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, April-June 2003.