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FISHING CONFLICT 

IN 

BATTAMBANG

 

 TABLE OF CONTENTS 

  1. Introduction

  2. Current Fishing Situation in Battambang
    2.1   Population
    2.2   Fishing Communes
    2.3   Population of Fishing Communes
    2.4   Land Holding of Fishing Households

  3. Destruction of Natural Resources

  4. Boundaries of the Fishing Lots

  5. Specific Cases of Conflict between Fishing Lots and Local People in Battambang

  6. Illegal activities of Fishing Lot Owners

  7. Human Rights Violations in the Fishing Lot Conflict

  8. Environmental Destruction of the Fishing Lot Owners
    1.    Pumping of lakes and ponds
    2.    Depleted fish species

  9. Impact on Local People

  10. Conflict Resolution

  11. The Weakness of the Fishery Law  

  12. Conclusion


 FISHING CONFLICT IN BATTAMBANG

  

I.     Introduction

 

In Battambang, there is a widespread and alarming conflict between villagers and fishing lot owners. The fishing lot owners have attempted to prevent local villagers from fishing in the fishing lot areas and villagers have resisted this attempt. This year, the conflict intensified as several people were arrested and a villager was shot and wounded.

 

Fishing lot owners are responsible for many illegal fishing activities. Local people are not happy with the current fishing lot system as the fishing lots put pressure on their sources of livelihood. The fishery law seems to give less consideration to local people. Legal loopholes and bad enforcement give the rich and powerful many advantages.

 

This report gives background information about the current fishing situation in Battambang, the illegal fishing activities by the lot owners, the human rights violations, the weakness of the fishery law and the details of recent conflicts between villagers and fishing lot owners. These conflicts have not been resolved despite several promises by government officials to look into the matter.

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II.  Current Fishing Situation in Battambang

 

Battambang province, which covers an area of 10,433 km2, is located in the northwestern part of Cambodia, bordering Thailand in the west, Bantey Meanchey in the north, Pursat in the south and southeast and Siem Reap and the Tonle Sap Lake in the east. The province consists of 12 districts, 89 communes and 611 villages.

 

2.1.  Population

 

The population census in 1998 shows that Battambang is a densely populated province with total population of 793,129 people. The population density is 68 per km2, which is slightly higher than the national density of 64. The population of this province constitutes 6.9% of Cambodian population. The percentage of female population accounts for 51%1.

 

Table 2.1 Population of Battambang in 1962 and 1998

Year

Population

Density (pop. per sq. km)

19622

552, 440

28.8

19983

793, 129 (boundaries reduced)

68.0 (after boundary changes)

Source: Population census 1962 and 1998.

                       

Since the population census in 1962, the population density has more than doubled. This increase has had an impact on the resource base that people need for their survival.

 

2.2.  Fishing Communes

 

The results of the population census in 1998 show that, in Battambang, about 71% of the population are involved in the agricultural sector. The rest, 24.9% and 4.1%, are involved in the service and industrial sectors respectively. Rice cultivation is a symbol of Battambang in both quality and quantity. The average rice yield at present is around 1.25 tons per hectare. Apart from rice, people supplement their incomes and livelihoods by fishing and cutting forest.

 

Almost half of the districts in Battambang consist of communes in which fishing is a significant activity (See table Table 2.2 below).

 

Table 2.2 The Fishing Communes by Districts

District

Population

No. of fishing communes

No. of non-fishing communes

Total

Ek Phnom

62 949

5

2

7

Moung Roussey

102 373

6

5

11

Sanke

99 672

6

4

10

Battambang

113 281

4

6

10

Svay Pao

130 251

3

7

10

Banan

71 479

1

7

8

Total

580 005

25

31

56

Source: Ahmed M. et al, 1998.

 

2.3.     Population of Fishing Communes

 

In 1994, the population of fishing communes constituted 36.4% of the total population. By 1998, the population of fishing communes had increased to 42.7% while the natural resource base had declined significantly. The average annual increase of the population of fishing communes over four years is estimated at 1.57%.  (See Table 2.3 on the next page).

 

Fishing is part of the traditional food collection for many families. Since most households have free access to common property resources such as lakes and rivers, it is cheaper to catch fish than buy it from the market. This was given as the main reason for choosing to fish as a preferred activity of the household.

 

Table 2.3 below shows a sharp increase in the population of most fishing communes between 1994 to 1998, with the greatest increases in Mong Reusey and Banon districts.

 

Table 2.3 Population Increase in Fishing Communes in Battambang, by District

Name of District

Population of Fishing Communes

 

in 19944

in 19985

% Increase

Ek Phnom

44 059

47 205

7%

Battambang

49 027

48 285

-2%

Sangke

54 272

58 488

8%

Mong Reusey

67 541

136 804

103%

Svay Pau

29 683

30 224

2%

Banon

10 358

17 847

72%

Total

254 940

338 853

33%

 

 

2.4.   Land Holding of Fishing Households

 

Land is an important asset of the rural household. It provides opportunities for diverse agricultural activities and to a large extent determines economic position.6  Fishing households on the average own less land than non-fishing households and many do not have any agricultural land at all. The Household Survey of Socio-economic Assessment of Freshwater Capture Fisheries of Cambodia reveals that in Battambang the estimated average land holding of the fishing household is about 1.45 ha per household, whereas for the non-fishing household it is around 2.02 ha per household.

 

The report shows that among 286 surveyed fishing households in Battambang's fishing communes, 41% of them are landless, 4.2% own land less than 0.5 ha, and 19.6% own land between 0.5 to 1 ha. The rest, 35%, have more than 1 ha. By comparison, among the  336 non-fishing households surveyed, only 10% are landless.

 

Table 2.4 Distribution of Agricultural land by size 1995-96

Household

Landless

0< land <0.5 ha

0.5< land <1 ha

land >1 ha

Total

No. of Family

%

No. of HH

%

No. of HH

%

No. of HH

%

No. of HH

Total

Fishing Household

118

41.3

12

4.2

56

19.6

100

35

286

100

Non-fishing Household

35

10.4

51

15.2

81

24.1

169

50.3

336

100

Source: Ahmed M. et al, 1998.

 

Besides cultivating agricultural land, people in rural areas still rely on natural resources that are held as common property for a wide range of uses. These resources, which are economically important in rural village life,7 include inundated forests, rivers, flooded ricefields and banks/beds of rivers/lakes. The dependence of fishing households that have little agricultural land on fishery resources for their day- to-day livelihoods and food security is very high.

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III.  Destruction of Natural Resources

 

Clearly, households depend on fishery and other resources. There is a declining trend in the availability of the products and benefits derived from common property resources. If these resources become unavailable in the future, the livelihood opportunities of the people will be affected, especially for the subsistence households whose alternatives are limited.

 

Traditionally, small-scale or artisanal fishers have provided fish for local consumption. But as fish become scarce and their value increases, it enters the global market and becomes unaffordable for common people. In the process, people are displaced and the private fishing companies take over completely.

 

The fish stock in Cambodia is declining. In the Mekong River system as a whole, there are 1200 known fish species8. Out of these, 500 species are reported to have resided in the freshwater bodies of Cambodia. However, a recent study found only 100 species now present around the Tonle Sap and adjacent rivers9.  Another source indicates that around 300 of the 500 fish species in the Great Lake Tonle Sap have diappeared10.

 

Encroachment and destructive practices are having an impact on the existing 700 000 ha of flooded forest in Cambodia. The flooded areas are becoming smaller and the flooding times are becoming shorter, which may cause a reduction in fish species that spawn and live in the flooded forests, especially highly migratory ones. There was a rapid reduction of the flooded forest over the 1980s and 1990s. About 50% of the flooded forest around Tonle Sap has been destroyed, including 90% of the flooded forests in Chnok Tru of Kompong Chhnang, which have been exploited intensively11.

 

Like other provinces, Battambang is facing similar threat. The natural resources have been destroyed in an unsustainable way. The Socio-Economic Assessment of Freshwater Capture Fisheries in Cambodia states that in Battambang, 99.8% of respondents reported that the availability of products from inundated forest has decreased, 99.1% reported a decrease in products from big rivers and lakes, and 98.7% reported a decrease in products from flooded ricefields.  (See Table 2.5 below).

 

Table 2.5 Percentage of Households Reporting Trend of Availability of Products and Benefits from Common Resources in Battambang

Common Resource

Inundated forest (%)

Big River/lakes (%)

Flooded Ricefield (%)

Increasing

0.0

0.2

0.0

Decreasing

99.8

99.1

98.7

Constant

0.2

0.7

1.3

Number of HH

465

447

396

Source: Ahmed M. et al, 1998.

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IV.        Boundaries of the Fishing Lots

 

Towards the end of the 19th century, the inland wetland fish catch was recognized as an important resource for the Cambodian diet and economy, as stated by Henry Kohout who traveled to Cambodia from 1857 to 1863. The industrialization of the inland capture fisheries for generating state revenue began around 1864, based on the advice of the French protectorate authority.12  The current fishing lot system was established in 1929.

 

In Battambang, there are 12 fishing lots. The fishing lot boundaries were developed mainly in colonial times and are still maintained. According to maps of the fishing lots (No. 6, 7 and 8), there are many villages located in the fishing lot boundaries. Since 1989, the population growth has remained at approximately 2.5% annually, while the fish yield remains below the yield that existed before 1970. Thus increasing numbers of local people, who typically have a small land holding with a low yield of rice cultivation, are facing difficulties as the entire fishing area of their villages are under the fishing lots.

 

Since the colonial time, the government has maintained the same boundary. Currently, the fishing lot boundaries are not clearly defined on the ground.  The fishing lot owners collude with fishery officials, policemen, military and district officials in determining the lot boundary.

 

The Royal Government has failed to be proactive in coping with a rapid increase of population and allocating resources to the newborn population. As a signatory to the UN Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the government should endeavor to ensure basic human rights, including the right to food security, the right to shelter and the right to freedom of its citizens. The government should also have a mechanism to protect the livelihoods of its people from exploitation by outsiders. The local people should not be subject to the exploitation of any investor, and development should not make local people vulnerable. However, the fishing lot owners tend to have a privilege over the fishing ground and, according to villagers, always claim that where there is water, there is a fishing lot boundary. People are prevented from fishing in these elastic fishing lot areas.13

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V.    Specific Cases of Conflict between Fishing Lots and Local People in Battambang

 

1.      Background to the conflict

 

The conflict between fishing lots and local people has been happening everywhere in Battambang where the fishing lots exist. In 1999, the fishing conflict intensified in Battambang, as villagers were prevented from fishing in areas of the fishing lot where people have fished for a subsistence living for generations. Some lakes within the fishing lots, where people claimed to have fished since time immemorial, have been taken away by the fishing lot owners and left thousands of people with no fishing ground. The local people have considered this as an unfair treatment, where the fishing lot owners, who are already rich, receive more privileges while the local people, who are poor, lose even their only fishing ground. In fact, although these lakes and water bodies are located within the fishing lot areas, the law does allow people to fish in certain areas of the fishing lot, while reserving other areas for the use of the fishing lot owners.

 

Fishing lots no. 7 and 8 are among the fishing lots that are auctioned to private owners. The biggest conflicts have occurred around fishing lots no. 7 and 8, which are located in Ek Phnom district, Battambang province. The owner of the fishing lot No.8, Mrs. Rourm Chanta, won the auction on August 12, 1999 at the cost of 203 million Riel, and has a full right to exploit fishery resources in the fishing lot no.8 for two years effective from the auction date29. Moun Chamroeun and  Theng Sary are among the four sub-leasees that bought a share from Rourm Chanta and have had conflict with local people over their fishing rights30. As for the fishing lot no.7, the owner, Tuy Map, won in the auction on August 2, 1997 at a total cost of nine million Riel, and has the right to fish in the fishing lot for two years effective from that date31. Tuy Map sold the fishing rights to two sub-leasees, Mr. Sao and Mr. Loch.

 

The owner of the fishing lot no.8 accepted an increase in auction price from 73 million to 203 million Riel, on the understanding that the government had offered him all lakes in the fishing lot32.

 

In fishing lot no.8, there are 58 lakes. The report of the commune chief of Prek Norin to a provincial investigation indicates that among 58 lakes in lot no.8, 31 lakes have traditionally been used by the fishing lot owner and the rest, 27 lakes, by the local people. The detailed names of these lakes can been seen in the attached annexe33.

 

602 people from 4 villages in Prek Norin commune have sent a written complaint to the Prime Minister about the violation of their fishing rights by the owner of fishing lot No.8, especially the two sub-leasees Moun Chanroeun and Theng Sary. 623 families from 3 villages in Peam Ek commune have sent a similar complaint to the Battambang Provincial Governor34.

 

Table 6.1 The number of villages, people and families filing a complaint against Fishing Lot No. 8

Village

Commune

No. of people and families filing a complaint against Fishing Lot No. 8

Ansong Sork

Prek Norin

196 People

Rohalsong

Prek Norin

196 People

Prek Norin

Prek Norin

70 People

Prek Trop

Prek Norin

140 People

Ta Korm

Peam Ek

168 Families

Kokdong

Peam Ek

81 Families

Prek Chdor

Peam Ek

374 Families

Source: Copy of the People's Complaint

 

Even though fishing lot owners have tried to stop local people from fishing within the fishing lot boundaries, local people in Peam Ek and Prek Norin communes keep fishing in Boeung Khmao and Boeung Chikcheap as they know that these two lakes are not listed in the burden book.

 

Seeing that the people ignored the order and still continued to fish, in November 29, 1999, Ek Phnom district authorities released a final order to inform the villagers who fished in the fishing lots No. 8 and 7 to remove their fishing equipment by December 02, 1999. If not, the people’s fishing equipment would be confiscated and taken to the provincial fishery department35. At the end of the deadline, two district policemen equipped with guns were sent to guard the Boeung Khmao Lake, on the premise that villagers were using illegal fishing equipment. Even with the presence of the police, the villagers continued to fish in the lake as they have always done.

 

Following the ineffective measures taken by the district authority, military officials called a meeting at the district center on December 20, 1999 with people from Preak Chdor village in order to resolve the conflict over the Boeung Khmao lake. The meeting did not produce any result as villagers kept saying that this lake belongs to the people and is excluded from the list in the burden book. However, the fishing lot sub-leasee maintained that it is in fishing lot boundary and should belong to the fishing lot owner. On December 21, 1999, policemen were sent to crack down on villagers who fished in Boeung Khmao lake and the confrontation became worse.

 

On January 9, 2000, six policemen were again sent to Boeung Khmao.  One villager from Preak Chdor village was shot and wounded in the leg by the policemen36 and other villagers were threatened with death if they tried to fish in the disputed lakes again. The responsible police have not been apprehended, nor has the case been seriously investigated.

 

At Boeung Chikcheap lake, a similar problem occurred in January 2000. Some 10 villagers were arrested for fishing in the lake belonging to the fishing lot and jailed for two nights37 at the provincial prison with very little food and water. Powerful officials tried to threaten them to give up fishing activities in the lake.

 

In general, local people lack both the right and the mechanism for state protection in terms of security and livelihood as citizens of a lawful state. The local people are subjected to violations from the rich and powerful, and are extremely vulnerable. The rich and the powerful tend to have strong support, while the local villagers lack support38.

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VI.       Illegal activities of Fishing Lot Owners

 

Deploying soldiers at the lakes without proper written permission, preventing people’s access to the fishing lakes not included in the list in the burden book, threatening civilians and wounding them are violations of the rights of the people, and contrary to the Constitution.

 

In a Public Forum on the Fishing Lot Conflict in Battambang on February 25, 2000, villagers made a number of allegations about the activities of fishing lot owners, as described below.  Many of these allegations are backed up by NGOs who work in the areas concerned.

 

In 1999, the fishing lot owners of lot no. 8 wanted to put into their control all lakes and bodies of water in the fishing lot boundary but not in the standard burden book. For instance, Boeung Khmao and Boeung Chikcheap are not in the list of an annex of the burdened books of lot no. 8. The standard burden book does not say the fishing lot owners can fish in all areas in the fishing lot boundary. Article 6 in the standard burden book states that the fishing activities of the fishing lot owners should be within the fishing lot boundary and outside the fishing ground reserved for local people. Article 11 in the standard burden book also states that people who reside in the fishing lot territory are allowed to fish in an area that is reserved for them. Therefore, local people who fish in particular lakes within the fishing lot are not violating the fishing lot owners' rights. In addition, Article 11 of the Fishery Law states that small scale family fishing for subsistence can be implemented at all the times in the protected fishing domain in the fishing lots during the closed season14. On the contrary, any effort to prevent local people from fishing in these lakes for subsistence livelihood is violating these articles15. Article 8 of the Fishery Law also states that Government fishing enterprises or solidarity groups which have a right to do fishing in the fishing lots must fully respect the burden book or fishing license16.

 

The local people have difficulty in travelling across the fishing lots. In the Public Forum on the Fishing Lot Conflict in Battambang on February 25, 2000, villagers expressed that the fishing lot owners very often have not allowed people to cross the fishing lots in the wet season.  At other times they have allowed travel, but required payment17. Article 11 in the standard burden book states that people who reside in the fishing lot territory are allowed to travel and transport any produce or fishing products across the area but must not damage the fishing activities in the fishing lots18. The fishing lot owners have interpreted the last sentence of this article to defend their abuses.  This is one example of inadequacies in the existing law, allowing fishing lot owners to find legal justification for their actions.

 

The people say that fishing lot owners do not allow people to dig a pond on their own land, which they need to keep water for family use and for irrigation purposes19. The lot owners based their argument on parts of Article 11 A2 in the standard burden book. In fact, Article 11 A2 in the standard burden book states that people can use water for family needs, for agriculture and for home gardening.  But it forbids any activity that leads to a change in the water regime which could affect the fishing activities in the lots20. We observe that this article does not distinguish clearly what people should and should not do. The fishing lot owners tend to take advantage of this article and ban any aquatic activities of villagers on their own land.

 

The people said the fishing lot owners always claim that where there is water there is a fishing lot boundary. Stopping people from fishing by using these words is contrary to the Fishery Law. There are no such words in either the Fishery Law, the Sub-decree on Fishery or in the standard burden book21.

 

As previously stated, some local people who tried to fish for subsistent living were arrested, and one was shot and wounded. Chapter 4 of the Fishery Law clearly states that if there is a violation of the law, district fishery authorities, the provincial fishery authority and the Department of Fishery has a right to fine the perpetrators or confiscate their fishing equipment.  In cases where these agencies are unable to solve these problems, the case should be transferred to the court22. Article 37 of the Fishery Law states that the person who transgresses this law must be admonished, punished with a fine, have any items of proof confiscated, or be confined to jail, depending on the degree of violation. Confiscation of the proof is the responsibility of the court. The fine is to be contributed to the national budget23. However, the law does not say the violator must be shot. The people have complained to the provincial authority, who referred the case to the provincial court, but the case was not investigated seriously24. People also complain that fines has never been administered properly according to the degree of violation, and it is not known to them exactly who has the authority to fine the people as sometimes police, military, fishing lot guards and district officials are all involved in fine collection. Article 34 of the Fishery Law states that during such an operation, the fishery officers and staff must wear their uniforms and badges as defined by the Ministry of Agriculture25. In fact, many officials do not clearly identify themselves and it is really hard to identify whether they are police, military or fishery officers or whether they are in the pay of fishing lot owners.

 

Also as stated previously, the demarcation of the fishing lot boundaries is not so clear on the ground. The boundaries are most often interpreted by the fishing lot owners alone, and have been poorly reinforced by the concerned institutions. The fishing lot owners have done little to maintain the border poles, and the people have been poorly informed. But Article 7 in the standard burden book states that before fishing activities commence, the fishing lot owner must put the pole along the fishing lot boundary and around the reserved fishing ground for local people26.

 

A survey of the incidence of illegal fishing practices by lot owners in Battambang by the MRC Freshwater Water Capture Project indicates among the 8 fishing lots in the province, 62% of them are pumping water to catch fish, 37.5% of them use electricity to catch fish, sweeping and brushing account for 50% each, followed by 25% extending the boundary.  (See Table 5.1 below).

 

 

Table 5.1 Types of Illegal Fishing Activities by Lot Owners in Battambang, 1998-99

Illegal Activities

Number of lots affected

Percentage of total no. of lots

Pumping

5

62.5

Electric

3

37.5

Sweeping

4

50

Extending

2

25

Brush

4

50

Source: Fishing Inventory, 199927.

 

The most common illegal activity of the fishing lot owners is the pumping of water out of the lakes to catch the fish with the use of a small mesh. Article 17 of the Fishery Law states that it is absolutely prohibited to do any kind of fishing in the inland fishery domain which uses destructive fishing equipment such as electrocuting fishing gear, explosives, any kind of poison, any means of pumping, bailing, or drying out any part of fishery domain, or any kinds of mesh smaller than 1.5 cm.28

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VII.     Human Rights Violations in the Fishing Lot Conflict

 

The conflict between villagers and fishing lots has stemmed from competition for fishery resources. The villagers can not avoid the conflict as their sources of livelihoods have been taken away by the fishing lot owners. The fishing lot owners have become preoccupied with their own interests, due to high investment costs and the uncertainty of return as the fish yield is in decline.

 

In this conflict, villagers are vulnerable but committed to a joint effort to save their livelihoods, despite the fact that the fishing lot owners have more support, power and money. While fishing lot owners violate the rights of the people, villagers are easily accused of wrongdoing. 

 

The 10 villagers who were arrested and the villager who was shot were all accused of using illegal fishing equipment and violating the fishing lot. The accusation is easily invented by those who are powerful and rich, but no proof was ever offered and no charges were ever brought to the court. The policeman who shot the villager was not taken to the court and the case was not investigated seriously, even while government officials continue to request villagers to respect the law. If the law is not able to prosecute the shooter and the wounded villager can not be granted justice, then that will encourage more shooting. The policeman was allowed to get away by inventing the story that it was not intentional. He said that he shot the ground but the bullet bounced to wound the villager39. This is the kind of loophole that allows the shooter to escape from the court.

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VIII.      Environmental Destruction of the Fishing Lot Owners

 

1.      Pumping of lakes and ponds

 

Pumping the water out of lakes for catching fish is a popular activity for the fishing lot owners. During the time they pump, they use a small mesh to filter the fish. No fish can escape. After pumping, the area dries up and the fish remaining in the mud, including baby fish, all die. In some areas, after pumping, they allow the water to flow back. In these cases, the water becomes polluted and the ecology of the water is disturbed.

 

The fishing lot owners always select only the large and medium size fish, and leave the small dead fish around the lake and in the water, leaving a bad smell. This practice is forbidden, as it can kill all fish in the lake; and if it continues, it will affect the next generation of fish and have a bad effect on other uses of the water, such as irrigation, animal and human use.

 

Pumping will lead to shallower lakes and changes in the water regime, making some water bodies disappear.

 

Lot owners use pumping in order to maximize their catch and generate enough revenue for payment to the government.  Lot owners are more concerned about their payment to the government than about sustainability of the catch because Article 3 in the burden book states that if the fishing lot owner pays an installment beyond the deadline they will be fined, and after two months they may be taken to court 40.

 

2.      Depleted fish species

 

Pumping the water and using the small mesh to catch the fish is really harmful for both fish and environment. According to the observation of local people, some fish species have already disappeared from some localities due to this practice. If these practices remain unchanged, more of the existing fish species will soon disappear.

 

Other practices such as sweeping, electric shock and brushing are also harmful to fishery resources and contribute to the depletion of fish species. Due to legal loopholes and weak enforcement, fishing lot owners continue to practice these methods but are never convicted. Instead, those who are poor and powerless and fish with traditional methods and equipment, are blamed for the mass destruction on fishery resources. 

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IX.        Impact on Local People

 

The fish caught by the fishing lot owners are not sold in the local villages. They selected the large and medium size fish for the market outside the area. The small fish are thrown away. Most of the fish products are exported to Thailand through Poipet. The rest mainly goes to Phnom Penh, and some are sold in the provincial market.

 

As a result, the villagers do not have enough food. As the rice yield per hectare per family is getting smaller and the population is increasing, the extent of the food shortage is becoming greater. The people’s reliance on fishing activities for food security has increased, but the fishing lot owners do not allow them to fish for meeting their needs. The reserves of fish that people use as ingredients to make prohok preserve and dried fish for eating during the rice cultivation and harvest time are no longer available.

 

Some families have been forced to stop their children from going to school, as they do not have a hundred or two hundred Riel note for their children to pay to the school. Instead, they are going together with their children to cut water-lilies and other aquatic products around their villages in order to support their family’s food.

 

People have wasted their productive time confronting the fishing lot owners. But after spending a huge time complaining to authorities from lower to top levels, they got few promises.

 

In dry season, the area surrounding the villages is fully dry. For example, in Preak Chdor village, people do not have enough water for home gardening and animal husbandry. Villagers claim that the fishing lot owners do not even allow people to dig a pond to store water for family use or to irrigate their own land41. People can not find jobs in the vicinity of the village and family food production has decreased. In the rainy season, agricultural activities are only possible before the area becomes completely flooded.

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X.        Conflict Resolution

 

The local people have complained to commune, district and provincial authorities and to the Prime Minister about the conflict with fishing lots in Battambang. On January 14, 2000, H.E Sar Kheng visited and talked to villagers from 5 communes in Ek Phnom district and agreed to form a Inter-ministerial Committee for Fishing Lot Conflict Resolution and to conduct a detailed study of the problems42.

 

The Inter-ministerial Committee was established on January 27, 2000 and consists of 8 high ranking government officials from five ministries, the Department of Fisheries and the Second Deputy Governor of Battambang. The task of this committee is to review and investigate the geographical area of each fishing lot, the number of lakes located near the villages and communes, and the estimated amount of fish in each lake43.

 

As of 25 February, the committee had not yet met. Nevertheless, the head of the committee and the members promised that they will study the requests of the villagers and will solve the problem later. In addition, a sub-committee will be established which will consist of the provincial governor, the head of the provincial department of agriculture, the head of the provincial fishery department, district governors and commune heads. There was no mention of allowing local fisherfolk to join the committee44.

 

Government officials have expressed concern about the idea of community management of fishery resources.  They feel that if the government allocates some fishing areas for communities there would be conflict among the user groups. However, the NGO community is willing to support the communities to manage the given fishing areas, and believes that if community fisheries methods are properly introduced there would be no significant conflict.

 

In the Public Forum on Fishing Lot Conflict in Battambang, the Fishery Department agreed to permit local people who live in the fishing lot areas to fish in some lakes within the fishing lots. H.E Ly Kimhan also promised that the Department of Fishery will investigate the issues and will decide to give more fishing areas if the people’s request is appropriate.  Local villagers are waiting for further details of these promises.

 

Table 10.1 The Fishing Grounds Promised to Local People in Battambang within Fishing Lots at the Public Forum on Fishing Lot Conflict, 25 February 2000

Fishing Lot

No. of Fishing Grounds Promised

Fishing Lot No. 2

58

Fishing Lot No. 3

None

Fishing Lot No. 4

2

Fishing Lot No. 5

2

Fishing Lot No. 6

8

Fishing Lot No. 7

8

Fishing Lot No. 8

25

Fishing Lot No. 9

2

Fishing Lot No. 10

7

Fishing Lot No. 11

2

Fishing Lot No. 12

5

Source: Public Forum on Fishing Lot Conflict in Battambang

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XI. The Weakness of the Fishery Law

 

Officials from the Department of Fisheries have acted to enforce the Fisheries Law, even while parts of the law are no longer appropriate for the current context. The current law was formulated in 1987 under the Vietnamese supported government and some restrictions relating to fishery practice are copied from the 1956 decree45.

 

Under the state dominated and controlled socialist model, the socialist countries in the lower Mekong basin sub-region have historically ignored environmental cost altogether in their quest for economic development. Given the all-encompassing role of the state and its lack of transparency in the countries that historically swore allegiance to and implemented different variants of this model, it is not surprising that the natural resource and environmental consequences of this model have been devastating. In this model, the natural resources were treated as unlimited resources and under the government control. Top down control was dominant and local people's interests were never fully incorporated into the law. Decisions mainly came from the top, despite the fact that they did not know the realities at the lower level, and people's participation in decision-making was never considered by the state46.

 

Since 1989, Cambodia has experienced privatization and a free market economy. The concepts of government fishing enterprises and solidarity fishing groups no longer apply to the Cambodia context. The solidarity groups made way for private capitalist enterprises owned by individuals. However, the laws and regulations on fisheries were unchanged and did not keep up with the free market economy.

 

The main focus of the Fishery Law is on the control and enforcement of the government, in which the Fishery Department plays a central role. The law tends to give fewer rights to local people living along the fishing grounds and does not provide for enforcement of their rights. In the Fishery Law, the fishery domain comprises all areas covered by water having sources from rivers, tributaries, lakes and streams, which are regarded as state property. People at large are struggling for food in the fishing areas where they have few rights under the law and easily fall into what the government calls illegal fishing activities.

 

The Fishery Law has provided for enforcement and control, making fisheries a significant generator of revenues for the national budget and contributing from 5.3% to 8.5% of GDP47. However, the Fishery Law gives less consideration to social factors. The Fishery Law allows more revenue to be extracted from the fishery resources but provides little for the social improvement in the fishing areas. For instance, while the fishing lot system is recognized as a method to stop illegal fishing and generate more revenues for the national budget, it is in conflict with the interests of the local people, inciting many social problems.

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XII.   Conclusion

 

As the population grows at a high rate and the natural resources decline rapidly, the commercial pressure on the diminished resources has a great impact on the livelihoods of the local people. The struggle for survival of the local people has led to conflict with fishing lot owners. The conflict has happened as both parties compete for their interests. The interest of the local people is for survival; and the interest of the fishing lot owners is for maximizing profits.

 

The state mechanism is not in place to protect the livelihoods of the local people. The fishing lot owners are getting richer while the local people are becoming poorer. The Fishery Law does little to solve the conflict, concentrating more on the fishing lot owners as a source of revenue for the national budget.

 

The fishing lot system, which is considered as a tool to combat illegal fishing, has in fact fuelled illegal fishing, mainly by the fishing lot owners, and has incited social conflict with local people. The conflict has reached a stage that demands a solution from the government, otherwise the problem may become worse.

 

The local people do not have any support and their voices have been regarded as unproven fact and groundless. However, their suggestions to have a right to fish in the areas where they used to fish should be subjected to a quick response in order for people to continue a living on a subsistent basis.

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1 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistic: General Population Census of Cambodia, 1998, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

2 Tichit. L, Agriculture in Cambodia.

3 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, op. cit.

4 Ahmed et al. 1998. Socio-Economic Assessment of Freshwater Capture Fisheries of Cambodia; Report on a Household Survey.

5 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics, General Population Census of Cambodia 1998; Final Census Result.

6 Ovesen, J. et al. 1996. When every household is an island: social organization and power structure in rural Cambodia

7 Ibid.

8 Rainboth, W. J., 1996. Fishes of Cambodia Mekong. FAO Species identification guide for fishery purposes. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome.

9 Van Zalinge, .N and Thouk N, Fishery Management Issues in Cambodia, Abstract, MRC/DoF/DANIDA, December, 1998

10 CEDAC; Abstracts of News on Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resource Management from Local Newspaper, October 1998.

11 Raksmey Kampuchea Daily, 27.03.98.

12 Tana, T.S., Bureaucratization the Management or Specializing the Communication for Better Consensus Between the Fishing Community and the Administrative System: Paper for the National Workshop on Fishery and Fishery Management in the Mekong River Basin, 6-7 October, 1998.

13 The villager’s speech at the Public Forum on the Fishing Lot Conflict in Battambang on 25 February 2000 in Battambang.

29 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Department of Fishery; Burden Book, Fishing Lot No.8, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001.

30 Koh Santepheap Daily, 14 January 2000 and Interviews with Villagers of Preakchdor village, Ek Phnom district, Battambang province on 02 February 2000.

31 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Department of Fishery; Burdened Book, Fishing Lot No.7, 1997-1998 and 1998-1999.

32 Rasmei Kampuchea Daily, Vol.8, No. 2047. 19 January 2000.

33 Seng Yi, Prek Norin Commune Chief; Report on lakes belonging to fishing lot owner and people in lot No.8.

34 Complaints of people from Ansong Sork, Rohalsong, Prek Norin, Prey Trop, Ta Korm, Kokdong and Prek Chdor villages

35 Sankat Tachreng Fishery, Notification No. 124  Por Tor Chor, 30 November 1999.

36 Cambodia Daily; 03 March 2000.

37 Ibid.

38 Note by Akphiwat Satrey; Report of the Conflict in Battambang, 2000.

14 State of Cambodia, The Fishery Law, No.33 Kro Tor, 1987.

15 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Department of Fishery; Burden Book, Fishing Lot No.8, 1999-2000 and 2000-2001.

16 State of Cambodia, The Fishery Law, No.33 Kro Tor, 1987.

17 The Public Forum on Fishing Lot Conflict in Battambang, 25 February 2000.

18 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Department of Fishery; Burden Book, Fishing Lot No.8, and 7.

19 Raksmei Kampuchea Daily; Fishing lot conflict resolution, Vol. 8, No. 2047, 19.01.2000.

20 Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Department of Fishery; Burden Book, Fishing Lot No.8, and 7.

21  The Public Forum on Fishing lot Conflict in Battambang, 25 February 2000 and  State of Cambodia, The Fishery Law, No.33 Kro Tor, 1987.

22 State of Cambodia, The Fishery Law, No.33 Kro Tor, 1987.

23 Ibid.

24 Koh Santepheap Daily; People complain but nobody resolves the problem, No. 3767, 07 December 1999.

25 State of Cambodia, The Fishery Law, No.33 Kro Tor, 1987.

26  Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Department of Fishery; Burdened Book, Fishing Lot No.8, and 7.

27 Vuthy, L. et al. The Management of the Freshwater Capture Fisheries in Cambodia: Legal Principle and Field Implementation, Presentation Paper for the Environment Working Group Meeting of NGO Forum on January 21, 2000.

28 State of Cambodia, The Fishery Law, No.33 Kro Tor, 1987.

39 Cambodia Daily, op.c.t.

40  Kingdom of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery, Department of Fishery; Burdened Book, Fishing Lot No.8, and 7.

41 Raksmei Kampuchea Daily; Fishing Lot Conflict Resolution in Battambang, Vol. 8, N. 2047, 19.01.2000

42 Raksmei Kampuchea Daily; Fishing Lot Conflict Resolution in Battambang, Vol. 8, N. 2047, 19.01.2000

43 Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on establishing the Inter-ministerial Committee for Fishing Conflict Resolution with people in Ek Phnom district, Battambang province, January 27, 2000.

44The Public Forum on Fishing Lot Conflict in Battambang, 25 February 2000.

45 Van Zalinge. N and Thouk, N, Fishery Management Issues in Cambodia, 7-8 December 1998.

46 Malhotra, K. 1998. The Political Economy of Natural Resource Conflict in the Lower Mekong Sub-Region, Executive Summary prepared for Consultative Conference on Promoting Dialogue on Natural Resources of The Lower Mekong, August 23-25, 1998, Bangkok, Thailand.

47 Thuok, N. and Leng, M. 1998. Socio-economic Importance of Freshwater Fisheries of Cambodia. Contribution to the National Workshop on Fisheries Livelihood and Fisheries Management in Cambodia, 6-7 October 1998, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

 

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